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Abstract 
 
Numerous empirical studies have documented the evidence of institutional significance 
towards economic growth. This study extends such evidence as it examines the link between 
institutions and growth in developing countries including East Asian region. By using 
neoclassical growth framework augmented with institutional controls and latest estimation 
technique in panel data analysis, this study finds evidence of positive institutions growth-
effects and uncovers the channel of their effects toward growth. This study also fills the gap in 
the East Asian growth literature, in which, to the best of our knowledge, only two studies 
namely Rodrik (1997) and Campos and Nugent (1999) that document the institutional 
importance toward economic growth for the region and apparently these studies are for the 
period before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
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1.0 Introduction  
The East Asian countries have seen spectacular economic development in the region for the 
past three decades. Table 1 below shows the countries in the region have undoubtedly 
achieved miraculous economic growth for the period up to 1996 with the rates of GDP per-
capita growth ranging between 4-7 percent on average
1
. The dramatic performance of the 
region is arguably the results of several institutional qualities
2
 that were present in the 
countries such as strong authoritarian government implementing numerous pro-growth 
policies, secure private property rights and bureaucratic efficiency (see for example 
theoretical analyses by Ahrens (2002) –strong and authoritarian governments and secure 
property rights; Gonzalez and Mendoza (2001) –well-functioning public institutions). 
Empirically, Rodrik (1997) and Campos and Nugent (1999) show that secure property rights 
and bureaucratic efficiency are the significant determinants of the region’s economic 
performance. These are the only two empirical studies focusing on the institutional effect on 
East Asian growth that we are aware of and apparently they are for period before the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997. 
As also shown in Table 1, the miraculous growth achievement has however disappeared 
beginning 1997 as a consequence of the Asian financial crisis (AFC). Except China, all the 
other countries were unable to achieve the pre-crisis level of economic growth. The World 
Bank (1998) suggests that institutional failures are among the causes of the crisis. Lanyi and 
Lee (1999) and Lingle (2000) argue that the absence of transparency and accountability and 
                                                 
1
 The phenomenal economic performance during the period 1960s to 1990s was dubbed as “the East Asian 
Miracle” by the World Bank (1993). There are studies that documented the underlying factors behind the 
economic achievement by the region such as Young  (1995), Krugman (1995), Collins and Bosworth (1996), 
Sarel (1997) Senhadji (2000), Han et al. (2002), Nelson and Pack (1999), Easterly and Levine (2002), and Iwata 
et al. (2002). 
2
 Influential studies such as those by Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2005), and Rodrik et al. 
(2004) has found evidence that institutions do affect growth. 
3 
 
too much intervention and politicisation from the autocratic government are the main causes 
rendering the countries vulnerable to crisis. 
Table 1:  
Average Real GDP Per-capita Growth for East Asian countries 1960-2008 
Year 
1960-
1980 
1981-
1984 
1985-
1988 
1989-
1992 
1993-
1996 
1997-
2000 
2001-
2004 
2005-
2008 
Average 
1960-96 
Average 
1997-08 
China 2.7 8.2 9.2 6.1 10.2 7.0 8.3 9.9 7.3 8.4 
Hong Kong 6.6 5.2 6.9 3.6 1.9 1.3 2.9 4.8 4.8 3.0 
Singapore 6.7 5.0 4.2 4.5 6.2 3.5 2.7 2.2 5.3 2.8 
South Korea 5.1 6.3 8.4 6.5 6.4 2.9 4.0 3.7 6.5 3.5 
Malaysia 4.1 3.9 0.8 6.0 6.8 1.0 2.5 3.6 4.3 2.4 
Thailand 4.3 3.3 6.2 8.2 6.8 -1.6 3.9 3.4 5.8 1.9 
Indonesia 3.2 4.1 3.3 6.5 6.0 -2.3 3.1 4.5 4.6 1.8 
Philippines 2.2 -2.4 -1.0 -0.2 1.9 1.3 2.3 3.3 0.1 2.3 
Source: Own calculation. The original data are obtained from the World Development Index (WDI) from the 
World Bank (2009). 
 
 
This study investigates the link between institutions and economic growth in developing 
countries from East Asia, Africa and Latin America for the period of 24 years from 18985-
2008. Utilizing neoclassical growth model controlling for the steady state determinants, we 
find empirical support for the significant institutional qualities that matter for growth. 
Specifically security of property rights that is consistently significant across all estimations 
and samples, and  this finding confirms that of Rodrik (1997) . We also find evidence to the 
strong government hypothesis that matter for growth in the East Asian region as proposed by 
Ahrens (2002). Furthermore, we also show that institutions affect growth via total factors 
productivity channel. 
The remainder of this paper is as followed: section 2 presents the growth framework, 
methodology and data sources. Discussions of the estimation results are presented in section 3 
and section 4 concludes.  
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2.0 Growth framework, methodology and data sources 
Consider the following Cobb-Douglas function, which exhibits constant returns to scale but 
diminishing return to individual factors:  
  1)( itititit LAKY  (1) 
where α < 1, and Y is the real output, K  is the physical capital, and L  is the amount of 
labour. A  represents a labour-augmenting technology assumed to grow exogenously at rate g. 
After incorporating the institutional effects that is assumed to influence growth via total 
factors productivity captured in the A function, the standard derivation of steady state income 
per capita function is therefore: 
 itititit gnsIgtAy 


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lnln 0  (2) 
The assumption that institutions affect growth via total factors productivity (the A function) 
and not via physical capital investment (ln sit) will be valid if coefficients for both institutions 
and investment terms are significant indicating that their separate channel of effects
3
. The 
functional form of Equation (4) with appropriate error term is therefore specified as the 
following: 
  ititititititit gnsIyyy    lnlnlnlnln 4321101  (3) 
where β’s are the parameters to be estimated.  
                                                 
3
 If institutions primarily affect investment and therefore indirectly affecting growth (via investment channel), 
the Solow framework could therefore be extended to include institutions via its as a function of institutions i.e.
)(Ifs  and 0)(
' If . However, the implication from this specification is that, if it is true institutions affect 
growth via investment channel only, it will be redundant to include both investment and institutions as regressors 
in a growth model. Investment (as a proximate growth determinant) should therefore be omitted. On the other 
hand, if institutions affect growth only partially via investment channel, omitting investment would not be 
appropriate as important information would be lost (see Dawson (1998) for more discussion on the possible 
channel of institutional impact towards growth and the consequent assumptions need to be made). 
5 
 
A panel observation for 69 developing countries in three regions namely East Asia, Africa 
and Latin America for a period of 25 years (1984-2008) is used. The data is converted into 4-
year average hence making t=6 throughout the sample period. As for the East Asian countries, 
the 4-year average data fit nicely to the division between the period of high growth (1985-
1996, t=1, 2 and 3) and the period post-AFC (1997-2008, t=4, 5 and 6). The Data on real GDP 
per capita and population growth are obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI) 
from the World Bank (2009). We conveniently follow Mankiw, et al. (1992), Islam (1995), 
Caselli et al. (1996) and Hoeffler (2002) to assume exogenous technological change plus 
depreciation rate as 0.05. Similarly, we follow them to use investment share of real GDP per 
capita as a proxy for physical capital and the investment data are obtained from Penn World 
Table 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009). To reflect institutional settings in the East Asian region, three 
classes of institutions are introduced i.e. property rights, bureaucratic efficiency, and political 
institutions. Four indicators from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) provided by the 
PRS Group (2009) –Investment Profile4 and Law and Order to reflect secure property rights; 
Bureaucracy Quality and Government Stability to reflect bureaucratic efficiency –whereas an 
index of Political Rights from Freedom in the World, also known as Gastil index (Gastil, 
1978) and Polity2 indicator from Polity IV by Marshall and Jaggers (2008) are used to reflect 
political institutions
5
. 
In this study, we employ the latest panel data system GMM method developed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), in addition to Pooled Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) and panel fixed effect methods, to estimate Equation (4)
6
. System GMM method is 
                                                 
4
 It is a merged version of Government Repudiation of Contracts and Risk of Expropriation indicators previously 
found in ICRG data (IRIS dataset version). Refer Knack and Keefer (1995). 
5
 Both Political Rights and Polity2 indicators represent the rating score for a country as far as the level of 
democracy is concerned, and the higher the score, the more democratic a country is. Therefore, a positive sign is 
expected since it is argued that a more democratic government cause better economic growth.  
6
 The estimation using Pooled OLS and fixed effect methods will afford an appropriate comparison with 
previous institutional studies, such as Rodrik et al. (2004) and Glaeser et al. (2004) that rely on such method. 
6 
 
shown to be able to correct unobserved country heterogeneity, omitted variable bias, 
measurement error, and potential endogeneity that frequently affect growth estimations using 
pooled OLS and fixed effect methods (Bond et al. 2001). System GMM is also capable to 
reduce potential bias and imprecision associated with a simple first-difference GMM 
estimator (Arrellano and Bover, (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998)).  
The general assumptions for the system GMM regression are as follows: we treat lagged 
dependent variable as predetermined variable and both investment and population growth as 
potentially endogenous variables. Similarly, we assume all institutional variables are 
endogenous since reverse causality from growth to institutions is possible. We set the 
instruments lag to be one to two periods for the predetermined, potentially endogenous and 
endogenous variables
7
. This assumption is meant to eliminate endogeneity bias. With this 
assumption, we postulate that, once the steady state determinants are controlled for, growth-
effect of institutions would originate from the state of institutions in the past four to eight 
years to cause an inter-temporal influence on the current institutions
8
. 
Consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the instruments. As suggested 
by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998), two 
specification tests are used. Firstly, Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions which 
tests for overall validity of the instruments and the null hypothesis is that all instruments as a 
group are exogenous. The second test examines the null hypothesis that error term it  of the 
                                                 
7
 These sets of lag are finally chosen after a series of attempts involving multiple combinations of lag were made 
in running the system GMM regression. The decision to use these sets of lag is because they yield the best 
results as far as the significance of the steady state determinants and institutional variables as well as the strength 
of diagnostic test of the regressions are concerned.  
8
 We follow Bond et al. (2001) to employ one-step GMM estimators since efficiency gain from two-step GMM 
estimators is shown by Bond et al. to be small, and two-step estimators normally converge to its asymptotic 
distribution relatively slowly, and in finite sample its asymptotic standard errors can be seriously biased 
downwards, and thus making it unreliable. Despite the Windmeijer (2005) correction to this problem to achieve 
robust standard errors in two-step GMM estimation, we already enforce heterokedasticity and autocorrelation 
robust standard error in the one-step GMM estimation, therefore one-step GMM estimation is preferred. 
7 
 
differenced equation is not serially correlated particularly at the second order (AR2)
9
 Ones 
should not reject the null hypothesis of both tests.  
3.0 Estimation results and discussions 
The results of the estimation are presented the Table 2 and 3 below. Table 2 contains results 
for the whole developing countries and East Asian samples meanwhile Table 3 shows the 
results for East Asian sample for the period before and after the AFC. The parameters of 
interest in our estimations are the institutional variables as well as the investment term. Based 
on the results in Table 2, the investment variable is consistently statistically significant and 
positive across all estimations. This finding, coupled with significant institutional variables 
clearly supports the assumption that institutions affect growth via factor productivity channel 
and not via investment.  
As for the institutional variables, on overall, security of property rights emerges the most 
important institutional quality that matters for growth for both samples across all estimations 
methods (Investment Profile variables are positive significant in all estimations for both 
samples, while Law and Order shows some influence to growth particularly in the whole 
sample). Besides, bureaucratic efficiency significantly determines growth particularly in 
whole sample (particularly Government Stability) but not in East Asian sample. Therefore, 
these results confirm the finding by Rodrik (1997) on the importance of secure property rights 
environment, but yield opposite evidence to that of Campos and Nugent (1999) and Gonzalez 
and Mendoza (2001) that shows significant effect of bureaucratic efficiency to growth (albeit 
partially since the quality is an important growth determinant in whole sample that also 
includes East Asian countries).   
                                                 
9
 By construction, the differenced error term is probably serially correlated at first-order even if the original error 
is not. While most studies that employ GMM dynamic estimation report the test for first order serial correlation, 
some do not. 
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Another important finding is the consistently negative coefficient for Political Rights variable 
(for Polity2, some of its coefficients are) particularly in the estimation of East Asian sample. 
Recall Ahrens (2002) shows strong and autocratic government in the East Asian countries that 
are able to govern the markets and pursue (and enforce) pro-growth policies is the underlying 
reason behind the countries’ dramatic economic success. The finding in this section therefore 
gives empirical support to the strong government hypothesis.  
As for the East Asian sample between the period of pre- and post-AFC as shown in Table 3, 
on overall, investment term is consistently positive significant across all estimations and 
periods thereby giving further evidence to our earlier assumption on the channel of 
institutional effect towards growth.  For institutional variables, it is fair to say, as far as the 
period of high growth or pre-AFC is considered, all three key institutional characteristics i.e. 
secure property rights, bureaucratic efficiency and strong government are the key growth 
determinants (reflected by the positive significant Investment Profile, Bureaucracy Quality, 
and negative significant Political Rights variables, respectively). For the period of post-AFC, 
with the exception of property rights quality which is positive significant as expected, the 
other two key characteristics however yield ambiguous results. Notwithstanding that, negative 
coefficients for Political Rights remain. 
As far as the empirical performance of system GMM estimation in this study is concerned, it 
is of reasonably satisfactorily robust. The test for first order serial correlation in the residuals 
AR(1) show that null hypothesis of no first order serial correlation is overwhelmingly rejected 
in all estimations and samples, which is not unexpected. Meanwhile, test of second order 
serial correlation AR(2) on overall shows that all estimations have no problem of second 
order serial correlation since AR(2) test statistics are unable to reject the null of no second 
order serial correlation  (p-value from 0.102 to 0.169 in all four estimations).  
9 
 
Hansen test for overidentification meanwhile indicates the null of exogenous instruments is 
not rejected with p-value from 0.734-1.000. Nevertheless, the implausibly good p-value of 
this range for Hansen J test should be interpreted with caution since the test is apparently 
weakened by too high instrument count
10
.  
                                                 
10
 Nevertheless, there are numerous studies employing system GMM that report p-value of 1.000 or close to 
1.000 for Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, see for example Baltagi et al. (2009), Hassan et al. (2009), 
etc. 
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Table 2:  
Estimations of growth model augmented with institutional variables for whole countries and East Asian samples 
Method Whole sample: 69 developing countries East Asian sample: 14 countries 
Sample Pooled OLS Fixed effects System GMM Pooled OLS Fixed Effects System GMM 
Constant -0.142*  (0.078) -0.23*** (0.084) -0.279** (0.126) -0.102 (0.080) -0.192** (0.095) -0.173 (0.143) 
ln (yit-1) -0.002  (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) 0.001  (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.003) 
ln (sit)  0.017***  (0.004) 0.015* (0.008) 0.033*** (0.009) 0.017*** (0.005) 0.028*** (0.008) 0.039*** (0.011) 
ln (n+g+δ)it 0.008 (0.007) 0.022**(0.011) 0.019* (0.012) 0.009 (0.008) 0.019 (0.012) 0.013 (0.015) 
Investment Profile 0.003*  (0.002) 0.005***(0.002) 0.003* (0.002) 0.005**  (0.003) 0.006** (0.003) 0.005* (0.003) 
Law and Order 0.002*  (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) 0.003 (0.002) 0.003  (0.002) 0.003* (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
Bureaucracy Quality 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.004** (0.002) -0.002 (0.003) 
Government Stability 0.004*  (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 0.005** (0.002) -0.001  (0.002) -0.004** (0.002) -0.000 (0.003) 
Political Rights 0.002  (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003) -0.004* (0.002) -0.003 (0.003) -0.005 (0.003) 
Polity2 -0.001  (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 0.002  (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 0.003 (0.004) 
R
2 0.250 0.493  0.162 0.407  
Adj. R
2 0.233 0.376  0.143 0.270  
No. of instruments   127   113 
AR1 p-value   0.032   0.048 
AR2 p-value   0.102   0.166 
Hansen p-value   1.000   1.000 
Notes: Dependent variable is log real GDP per capita growth. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond tests for first-order and 
second-order autocorrelation in the residuals of differenced equation, respectively. Hansen test of overidentification tests for Ho: the instruments as a group are exogenous. 
***, **, and * indicate the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3:  
Estimations of growth model augmented with institutional variables for East Asian samples pre- and post-AFC 
Sample East Asian countries for the period pre-AFC (1985-1996) East Asian countries for the period post-AFC (1997-2008) 
Method Pooled OLS Fixed effects System GMM Pooled OLS Fixed effects System GMM 
Constant -0.101  (0.079) -0.189** (0.093) -0.188 (0.151) -0.114 (0.081) -0.188** (0.094) -0.251 (0.153) 
ln (yit-1) 0.002  (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.004) 
ln (sit)  0.018*** (0.005) 0.028*** (0.007) 0.042***  (0.012) 0.021*** (0.005) 0.029*** (0.008) 0.046*** (0.012) 
ln (n+g+δ)it 0.008 (0.008) 0.019 (0.012) 0.013 (0.015) 0.009 (0.008) 0.019 (0.012) 0.019 (0.016) 
Investment Profile 0.009*** (0.003) -0.003 (0.005) 0.008** (0.003) 0.008** (0.004) 0.009*** (0.003) 0.008* (0.004) 
Law and Order -0.003 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) -0.004 (0.003) 0.006 (0.005) -0.000 (0.004) 0.005 (0.007) 
Bureaucracy Quality 0.003** (0.001) 0.004* (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) -0.012** (0.006) -0.004 (0.004) -0.016 (0.010) 
Government Stability 0.003 (0.004) 0.004 (0.005) 0.003 (0.004) 0.000 (0.003) -0.003 (0.002) 0.002 (0.003) 
Political Rights -0.01*** (0.002) -0.002 (0.003) -0.006* (0.003) -0.013** (0.007) -0.011** (0.005) -0.015 (0.010) 
Polity2 0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.003) 0.012*  (0.007) 0.009* (0.005) 0.015 (0.011) 
R
2 0.152 0.403  0.135 0.405  
Adj. R
2 0.133 0.265  0.115 0.268  
No. of instruments   92   74 
AR1p-value   0.051   0.032 
AR2p-value   0.169   0.143 
Hansen p-value   0.974   0.734 
Notes: Dependent variable is log real GDP per capita growth. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond tests for first-order and 
second-order autocorrelation in the residuals of differenced equation, respectively. Hansen test of overidentification tests for Ho: the instruments as a group are exogenous. 
***, **, and * indicate the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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4.0 Concluding remarks 
The East Asian countries have experienced a dramatic economic performance in the 
past three decades but an unprecedented financial crisis in 1997-1998 has however 
brought an end to the achievement, which the countries seem to never recover the pre-
crisis rate of growth. Utilizing neoclassical Solow growth framework augmented with 
institutional variables reflecting property rights, bureaucratic efficiency and political 
institutions, and employing latest estimation technique and dataset, this study finds 
empirical support to the proposition “institutions matter” for economic growth in 
developing countries and to show that the institutional growth-effect essentially runs via 
total factor productivity channel.  
Specifically, this study finds security of property rights (proxied by Investment Profile) 
matter significantly for growth in all developing countries under study including the 
East Asian region and this finding is consistent to different model specifications, sample 
of countries and time periods. Another notable finding by this study is the evidence to 
the strong government hypothesis (reflected by negative coefficient of Political Rights)  
for East Asian countries. Furthermore, this study is able to show that the institutions 
affect growth via total factors productivity. 
Arguably this study is the first as far as we are aware of that uses dynamic panel data 
analysis to test for institutions-growth linkage in developing countries particularly the 
East Asian countries for the period when significant growth achievement and severe 
financial crisis have happened.  
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